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About a year ago one of the visiting scholars was quite surprised when he
learned that Mongolia has its own nuclear policy. Asheadmiited, he had no idea
that Mongolia faced nuclear-related problems and that they directly affected the
country’s foreign and security policies. The brief exchange with this person
prompted this author to try to help fill the gap by identifying the most pressing
nuclear-related problems that Mongolia is currently facing and by describing
the measures it is taking to tackle them.
Nuclear Threat
Mongolia, as a peace-loving country, has a strong commitment to the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was
one of the first countries that signed and ratified the 1968 Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space treaty, and
the 1971 Seabed Treaty, all of which contribute to checking and containing the
nuclear threat
In the summer of 1972 Mongolia, already party to the NPT, signed with the
International Atomic Energy (IAEA) a comprehensive safeguards agreement,
covering all its current and future nuclear activities and a protocol thereto.
Since then Mongolia has been actively participating in the work of the
Agency’s General Conference and its other bodies. For more than two decades
it has been cooperating with the Agency in various fields and has jointly imple-
mented numerous small projects. In 1995-96 the Agency and Mongolia will
cooper-ate on such projects as manpower development and nuclear tech-nology
support, development of nuclear analytical techniques, the introduction of
nuclear techniques in agriculture, improving livestock productivity and health,
and upgrading nuclear medic cine services. Mongolia plans to join other coun-
tries in making with using gamma rays to extend the freshness of meat, milk and
vegetables without refrigeration, treating patients with radiation and in the early
detection of genetic disorders in infants, of can-cer, heart disease and other
ailments. Despite energy shortages, as of 1994 Mongolia has no plans to de-
velop nuclear energy.
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In the international arena, on most nuclear-related issues, especially those
connected with nuclear disarmament and the reduction of the danger of nuclear
war, Mongolia has been strongly in favor of halting the nuclear arms race and of
developing nu-clear cooperation solely for peaceful purposes.
Nevertheless, despite its consistent peace-loving policy, from the mid-
1960s until the mid - 1980s Mongolia, being caught in the middle of the Sino-
Soviet ideological and political dispute, was under the constant threat of the
dispute escalating into open conflict. With Soviet troops stationed on its terri-
tory*, Mongolia had no guarantee that the Sino-Soviet conflict would not affect
or engulf it nor that only conventional weapons would be used if open warfare
were to erupt.
The geopolitical and security environment of Mongolia began to change
as a result of the policy of perestroika and the new political thinking in the Soviet
Union in the late 1980s. The main factors that influenced the external environ-
ment were the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations; gradual changes in the
Soviet-Mongolian “special” relationship, and, above all, the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, up to 1990 the sole guarantor of Mongolia’s external security.
Deideologization of Mongolia’s foreign and domestic policies, the pursuit of an
open economic policy abroad, the democratization of society, and the transition
to a market economy have also influenced Mongolia’s policy. This led to the
revaluation of Mongolia’s security policy as well as of its relations with both
neighbors. Short of declaring that it would henceforth adhere to the principle of
a balanced relationship between its neighbors, in Mongolia’s relations with
them due ac-count would be taken of their policies in regard to its own national
interests, above all its vital national interests.
Furthermore, it was announced that a policy of non-align-ment and neu-
trality would be pursued in relation to disputes that might arise between the two
neighbors, unless they affected Mongolia’s vital national interests. Bearing in
mind the limited policy choices it had in the past, Mongolia has declared that it
would seek to follow a multi-based policy, i.e. that it would aim to diver-sify and
expand its relations with other countries, especially with influential ones. Mind-
ful of its previous experiences, Mongolia also declared that in pursuance of the
policy of ensuring its security principally by political means, it would not allow
the use of its territory against other states. This policy is in line with the Russo-
Chinese joint statement to the effect that they would not use territories or air-
space of adjacent countries against each other.
* According to some sources, about 60,000 Soviet troops were stationed in Mongolia
in 1967, a number that rose to more than 75,000 by the end of the 1970s.
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In accordance with this policy, Mongolia has signed bilateral treaties of
friendly relations and cooperation with Russia and China. In both cases the
parties pledged not to participate in any military-political alliances directed against
the other party, not to conclude with third states any treaties and agreements
that would run counter to the interest of sovereignty and independence of the
other party, and that they would not allow the use of their territory by third
states for hostile actions against the other party. Moreover, in the treaty with the
Russian Federation, the Russian side pledged to respect neither Mongolia’s
policy of not allowing foreign troops nor nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction to be stationed on or to transit its territory.
Nuclear-weapons-free Zone (NWFZ)
Mindful of the two decades of nuclear threat that hung over Mongolia, in
September of 1992 Mongolia’s President P.Ochirbat declared Mongolia a nuclear-
free zone. This policy was not only aimed at ensuring its own security by politi-
cal means, but by implication Mongolia was also making a contribution to re-
gional stability and predictability. It also hoped to set a precedent for other
states to ensure their security not through possessing but rather by renouncing
the acquisition and stationing of such weap-ons on their territories.
Following Russia’s pledge to respect Mongolia’s NWFZ status, as men-
tioned earlier, in October 1993 an official American statement, besides offering
Mongolia explicit positive and nega-tive security guarantees, stated that if the
country ever faced a threat and decided to refer the matter to the United Nation
Secu-rity Council, the United States, along with other Council mem-bers, would
consider appropriate steps to be taken. By making such statement, the United
States has given Mongolia an assur-ance that it would not be indifferent not
only to potential nuclear threats to Mongolia but to any conventional threat as
well. To-gether with the assurances of respect for sovereignty and territo-rial
integrity by its neighbors, this statement represents the basis of international
political guarantees of Mongolia’s external secu-rity.
A few days after the American statement was issued, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman declared that China supported and welcomed Mongolia’s
becoming a NWFZ and that it would respect that status. The Chinese pledge
was later reiterated in the joint Mongolian-Chinese press statement at the end of
Premier Li Peng’s visit to Mongolia in April 1994. Soon thereafter Great Britain
and France followed suit by explicitly offering Mongolia their negative and
positive security assurances. In the summer of 1994 the Non-Aligned Move-
ment, for its part, also commended and expressed support for Mongolia’s NWFZ
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status.
Having obtained the support of nuclear-weapons and non-nuclear-weap-
ons states for its NWFZ status, Mongolia, as reflected in its National Security
Concept, adopted in the spring 1994 by its Parliament, is working to reinforce its
status on the multilateral level and make it an important element in the strength-
ening of national security by political means. Its long-term goal is to ex-tend this
status, if possible, to the Central Asian sub region as a whole, thus expanding
the area of nuclear security.
Nuclear Weapons Test Ban
The NWFZ status, though internationally recognized, does not automati-
cally ensure fully, at least for now, Mongolia’s nu-clear security, since nuclear-
related threats do not necessarily come solely in the form of direct or overt
threats. They also take the form of indirect threat to the population and the
environment as a result of radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests both in
the atmosphere and underground. Mongolia is more affected than most other
countries by nuclear tests and their consequences, due to its proximity of test
sites to Mongolian territory. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union
alone conducted about 715 tests, of which 506 were in the atmosphere. The vast
majority of these tests were conducted at the Semipalatinsk test site. China has
conducted forty-one testes at the Lop Nor test site, of which twenty-three were
in the atmosphere. Both of these test sites are relatively close to the Mongolian
border. Today China remains the only nuclear-weapons state that still conducts
nuclear weapons tests despite international concern and protests.
The direct and indirect effects of such tests on the population and the
environment (e.g. premature deaths, bone cancer, leukemia, genetic mutations,
chromosome aberrations, miscarriages and congenital malformations that cause
mental and psychological defects) have yet to be fully assessed in Mongolia as
they are currently being done in Russia. Mongolia expects its two neighbors as
well as relevant international organizations to help fully assess the damage
caused by nuclear tests.
On the international level, nuclear weapons tests not only heighten the
temptation to “go nuclear”. In other words, they contribute to the pressure not
only for horizontal proliferation, but also to vertical proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons, aimed at “improving” or “perfecting” the existing arsenals and warheads
by developing neutron and other types of bombs, low-weight, high-yield pluto-
nium warheads and the like.
It is for these reasons and to make its contribution to the cessation of all
nuclear-weapons tests that Mongolia has always strongly advocated a compre-
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hensive test ban. As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, it is currently
taking part in ne-gotiations to draft a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).
In August 1994, the Mongolian delegation introduced a working paper in
the Conference’s Ad Hoc Committee on a Nu- clear Test Ban. In the paper
Mongolia reiterated its belief that in order to strengthen the non-proliferation
regime and nuclear se-curity, the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be extended
for an indefinite period, and that all states, especially those with nuclear instal-
lations, should accede to the existing international treaties and agreements on
the physical protection of nuclear material, early notification of nuclear acci-
dents and other relevant interna-tional treaties. Spelling out the reasons that
prompted it to de-clare its territory a NWFZ, Mongolia noted that it was sur-
rounded by two nuclear weapons states and that, moreover, the region in which
the country is located has a number of near-nuclear states. Addressing the
Committee’s work, Mongolia stated that an early conclusion and strict imple-
mentation of the future multilateral, comprehensive test ban treaty with an effec-
tive verification mecha-nism would be the most appropriate way to universally
ban nu-clear testing. For the purpose of maintaining a positive atmos-phere and
promoting the negotiations, Mongolia called upon all nuclear weapons states to
refrain from testing nuclear weapons for the duration of the negotiations.
Bearing in mind its geographical location and geophysical features, which
were given in an annex to the working paper, for seismic, radioactive, infrasound
and electromagnetic monitoring, and guided by a desire to make practical contri-
butions to a comprehensive text ban, Mongolia proposed to establish an inter-
national verification site on its territory, which could form part of the CT; BT
global monitoring network. Mongolia’s offer was met with interest, and at present
informal consultations is underway in Geneva to identify the technical require-
ments for setting up such a verification site.
Nuclear Waste and Radiation
Another question that directly affects Mongolia’s long-term security in-
terests is the issue of land disposal of nuclear wastes by neighboring states in
the vicinity of its territory. This issue is acquiring great urgency especially since
the international prohi-bition of dumping of radioactive wastes in oceans by the
Conven-tion on the Prevention of Maritime Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter. The increased use of nuclear power stations in the world
urgently requires that states tackle nuclear waste dis-posal issues with due
regard for the interests of neighboring states and the world community as a
whole.
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The international community has been dealing with legal aspects of nuclear
disposal issues for decades, and not without some results. Besides the above
convention, the international community has adopted a Code of Practice on the
International Tran boundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, adopted on 21
September 1990 by the General Conference of the IAEA, and some other legal
instruments. Moreover, the Conference on Disarmament is currently drafting a
convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, bearing in mind, inter
alias, the “long-standing effects of radioactive contamination on living crea-
tures as well as on the environment”.
As for the question on the physical disposal of nuclear wastes, scientists
in many countries have been working on this problem for more than four de-
cades and still have not been able to come up with any successful solution. So
far, no proposal or plan to dispose nuclear waste rules out the possibility of
radioactive material leaking into the biosphere.
It is well known that nuclear reactions produce more than 200 by-prod-
ucts, most of which disappear within seconds. Some, however, particularly plu-
tonium 239 (one of the deadliest substances known to mankind), strontium 90,
and cesium 137, are not only highly dangerous but also extremely long-lived.
Scientists, for example, have calculated that plutonium 239 has a half-life of
24,000 years and that; therefore, in order to be safe, it must be stored for a
minimum of ten half-lives, which amounts to a staggering 244,000 years.
Until radioactive wastes are safely disposed of, states will always be ex-
posed to this silent threat, since the radiation produced by the decay of radioac-
tive materials, as defined in the draft convention on radiological weapons, would
bring about death, suffering, and environmental disaster and destruction. It is
for this reason that the United Nations General Assembly in its reso-lutions on
prohibiting the dumping of radioactive wastes has been making specific refer-
ence to potential hazards underlying any use of radioactive wastes that would
constitute radiological warfare.
It is, therefore, important that states that have nuclear wastes dispose of
them in a manner that would not cause damage, di-rectly or indirectly, in the
short term or in the long run, to neighboring states. This would be in line with
the responsibility that states bear for injurious consequences arising out of acts
not prohibited by international law as well as for the damage to the environment,
as underlined in the draft code of offenses against the peace and security of
mankind.
Since nuclear waste could be considered a gradually ap-plied radiological
weapon of mass destruction, it is imperative that states possessing such waste
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give guarantees to their neighbors that they would not dispose of it in a manner
that could even indirectly cause damage to the latter.
Due to its geographies location, Mongolia’s national interests are directly
affected by this problem. Although it is the sovereign right of every state to
build nuclear power stations, once a nuclear program is launched, that country
should see to it that it does not adversely affect the territorial integrity of neigh-
boring states, let alone threaten their security.
The question of nuclear waste disposal near Mongolia’s borders first came
up in the mid-1980s when three West German firms announced that China had
agreed to rent space in the Gobi Desert for the permanent storage of some 4,000
tons of spent fuel from Western Europe for a reported price of US$ 5.45 billion.
At that time spokesmen for the Chinese Ministry of Nuclear In-dustry and the
Chinese Nuclear Energy Corporation confirmed that discussions about long-
term storage were underway with the abovementioned firms.
Chinese interest in offering sites in the Gobi Desert for the dumping of
nuclear waste became even more evident when they also approached Swiss,
French and Japanese representatives. This interest was most probably moti-
vated by a desire to earn hard currency for China’s economic development, but
acceptance of large amounts of nuclear waste could have also had military
implications, since chemical processing of nuclear wastes yields plutonium and
enriched uranium which is potentially weapons-grade material. China’s decision
to negotiate the storing of nuclear wastes in the Gobi Desert was facilitated by
the fact that the region is thinly populated, Chinese environmentalists did not
have much clout, and Mongolia’s objections, if any, could have been ignored.
To the relief of Mongols and all other peoples potentially affected by this prob-
lem, the deal did not go through for various reasons. There was a general reluc-
tance in the West to deal with China on this politically and strategically sensi-
tive issue, in addi-tion to the German government’s opposition because a nuclear
processing plant was being contemplated in Germany. Besides, the firms would
have required prior approval by the United States which supplied West Ger-
many with most of its nuclear materials. Finally, although China had by that time
joined the IAEA, it had not yet agreed to on-site inspections of its storage
facilities by Agency inspectors.
In December 1988 the Chinese press reported again that a large waste
treatment and disposal base of 20,000 square me-ters was to be constructed by
1995 in Northwest China, in the Gobi Desert along the Silk Road, and that the
plant would proc-ess nuclear waste, including spent fuel from China’s planned
nu-clear power plants, which remains radioactive for thousands of years. With
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regard to high-level radioactive wastes, China report-edly is considering a plan
to store and treat them in deeper geo-logical layers, but possible sites have not
been disclosed.
China is presently operating two nuclear power plants, at Qinshan in
Zhejiang province and Daya Bay in Guangdong province. It is planning to build
additional plants because current estimates project an annual energy shortage
equivalent to some 150 million tons of standard coal by the year 2000 and 1.2
billion tons by 2050. The same applies to Russia as well. According to its deputy
minister of nuclear energy, the share of electricity generated at nuclear power
stations in Russia will grow from 14% in 1994 to 30-35% by the year 2010.
This, understandably, raises the question of safe land disposal of nuclear
wastes. In the fall of 1993 the Chinese media announced plans for four or five
radioactive waste disposal sites: in the Northwest (Gansu province), Southwest
(Sichuan province). South (Guangdong province), somewhere along the border
between Anhui, Jiangsi, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, and in the Northeast,
possibly in eastern Inner Mongolia. They are all reported to be designed to
store and treat low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes mainly from nuclear
power plants. Some-time later, it was announced that surveys and feasibility
studies have already been made at the northwestern site and that con-struction
work would shortly get underway. The location that the China Daily was refer-
ring to is Gansu province which borders on Mongolia’s three aimags of Gov’-
Altai, Bayan-Hongorand Omno-Gov’. It was further reported that the first-phase
project of the site would have a storage capacity of 60,000 cubic meters and
would go into operation in the mid-1990s. Its second-phase project would ex-
pand the site’s storage capacity to 200,000 cubic meters.
According to Chinese experts, low-and intermediate-level wastes from
nuclear facilities, including power stations, would first be solidified on site and
then transported to the disposal site, and that in certain cases liquid waste might
also be stored. It is not being ruled out that even waste from the military nuclear
industry would not be incorporated into the contemplated national radioactive
waste disposal program. This means that the proposed sites might also accept
liquid and even high-level wastes.
China’s plans for the disposal of nuclear waste raise questions that affect
the security interests of Mongolia. The reason is that China plans to go ahead
with its plans and store the waste even though there is no guarantee that it, any
more than industrialized countries, has a watertight solution to the ultimate
disposal of radioactive wastes. The absence of such guarantees entails grave
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risks for the biosphere in general, amid especially for the people living in that
region, including the population of Mongolia, and their fragile environment.
Mongolia, like any other country, would not want to have knowingly a
potential Chernobyl-type tragedy on its doorsteps anymore than on its territory.
Having declared itself a NWFZ, having become a party to the NPT and other
relevant conventions and treaties, Mongolia has in effect undertaken a commit-
ment that no nuclear-related threat would come to others from its territory. There-
fore, it is natural that, in return, Mongolia can also expect from others to ensure
that no nuclear-related threat, whether im-mediate or long-term, will ever endan-
ger Mongolia’s national security and its people’s well-being and survival.
It is for these reasons that Mongolia expects states, espe-cially its neigh-
bors, to take effective measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or other
radioactive wastes that would in-fringe upon the sovereignty of their neighbors
and that the Con-ference on Disarmament, when drawing up a convention on
the prohibition of radiological weapons, include radioactive wastes in the scope
of the convention. Both of these measures are in line with United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive
wastes, including its recent resolution 49/75A, adopted on 15 December 1994
without a vote.
In the immediate future Mongolia should approach the Chinese govern-
ment on this issue so as to be briefed on Chinese plans on this issue, on the
geological, hydrological, climatic, seismological and other characteristics of the
Gansu site and to seek assurances and acceptable safety guarantees against
any possible long-term radiological threat. Qualified technical advice could be
sought on this issue from the experts of the IAEA, the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and from technologically ad-
vanced countries.
